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Summary
Aim of the study. The aim of this paper is to present the selected aspects of social functioning of persons 
with diagnose of bipolar disorder (BD) or major depressive disorder (MDD). The main focus is on analyz-
ing the functioning of theory of mind, empathy and moral emotions among groups of patients. Considera-
tions also apply the possible mechanisms underlying the impairments of mentioned areas.
Material and methods. The analysis of present literature related to the subject.
Results. There are a lot of studies confirming the presence of handicap of theory of mind, empathy and 
moral emotions in patients with affective disorders.
Conclusions: Disturbances of social cognition and moral emotions are common among persons with BD 
or MDD. Raising awareness of the problems affecting this area may contribute to a better understanding 
of patients and help the clinicians in conducting effective therapy.
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AffECTIVE DISORDERS AND SOCIAl 
fUNCTIONINg
One of the most characteristic symptoms of af-
fective disorders – both bipolar disorder (BD) 
and major depressive disorder (MDD) - is im-
paired social functioning. According to numer-
ous studies, deterioration in this area is present 
not only in acute episodes of the disease, but 
also in periods of remission [1, 2]. What is var-
ied between episodes is, however, the severity of 
these disturbances and their specificity. For ex-
ample, in an episode of depression often there is 
an increased tendency to feel shame and guilt [3 
- 5], while in (hypo)mania aggressive behaviors 
and intensified propensity to ignore their neg-
ative consequences can appear [6, 7]. Period of 
euthymia casts more doubts among researchers, 
but many of them emphasize the persistence of 
certain trends (emotional, cognitive and behav-
ioral) characteristic for the patients not only dur-
ing acute episodes, but also in remission. Some 
of them can be therefore understood in terms 
of personality or temperament traits. Reference 
is made, for example, to impulsivity, sensation 
seeking and tendency to risky behavior in case 
of BD [8], and to the suppression of emotions 
and low sociability in MDD [9, 10]. There are 
several particularly important features of human 
emotional and cognitive functioning which are 
really worth discussing in the context of above 
considerations. They are presented below.
ThEORy Of MIND (TOM)
The concept of theory of mind was introduced 
to psychology by Premack and Woodruff in 1978. 
For authors, it meant a certain innate and uni-
versal ability to attribute mental states both to 
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self and to others, which enables us to under-
stand and predict behaviors [11]. In other words, 
by having developed ToM, we can notice and - 
to some extent - understand the thoughts and 
emotional processes that occur in us and in the 
people around us, perceive the interactions of 
these processes and their possible impact on be-
havior. ToM is therefore a valuable skill respon-
sible for our conscious functioning among oth-
ers and its impairment can be directly translat-
ed into difficulties in coping in the social world 
[12 – 14]. It should be noted that theory of mind 
is not a homogeneous construct. According to 
one of the divisions, there can be distinguished 
two components of ToM: (1) cognitive (which 
consists of attributing beliefs) and (2) emotional 
(attributing emotions and desires) [15]. Another 
conception points to two fundamental aspects of 
mentioned ability: (1) decoding the mental states 
on the basis of perceived clues (such as tone of 
voice, body posture or mimic expression) and (2) 
reasoning about these states, which is made pos-
sible by the integration of both contextual infor-
mation about the person and information drawn 
from the history (for example her/his specific ex-
perience, knowledge and attitudes), and is in-
tended to understand her/his behavior [16].
ThEORy Of MIND IN MOOD DISORDERS  
– BIPOlAR DISORDER
There are many scientific reports showing the 
inefficiency of theory of mind in people suffer-
ing from bipolar disorder. Most of these studies 
have focused on a group of patients with BD as 
a whole. The profile of social cognition shaping 
during the course of three phases of the disease 
and the nature of its changes remain vaguely 
defined. An important contribution to this topic 
was made by Cecilia Samamé [12], who reviewed 
more than 50 studies (from the years 1990-2012) 
comparing the quality of social cognition of bi-
polar patients and healthy volunteers. The re-
view identified a number of important issues: (1) 
in the first of these groups we can observe defi-
cits in emotion recognition and in ToM (see also: 
[17 – 19]), (2) these deficits are present during 
each of the phases of the disease: in (hypo)ma-
nia, depression and euthymia, and (3) difficul-
ties in performance of certain tasks measuring 
ToM (and some structural changes in the brain, 
which may be their biological substrate) are ob-
servable both in the group of euthymic bipo-
lar patients and in healthy individuals with in-
creased risk of developing BD (because of family 
history). Very interesting study was conducted 
by Lindsay Schenkel and her team [20]. The sci-
entists attempted to systematically explore the 
multidimensional approach of ToM by examin-
ing its functioning in the very young (pediatric) 
patients suffering from bipolar I or II disorder. 
Additionally, they wanted to see how the ToM 
deficits affect the real psychosocial disturbanc-
es in the functioning of the subjects. The study 
showed that BD I is associated with more im-
paired psychosocial functioning in comparison 
to BD II. Among particularly affected capabili-
ties there are: (a) recognition of others’ mental 
states based on observable premises and (b) un-
derstanding and prediction - based on contextu-
al clues - other people’s behavior. Another study, 
conducted by Sandra Baez and her colleagues 
[21] showed that patients with BD have difficul-
ties in recognizing facial expressions of negative 
emotions. Furthermore, in the task testing sensi-
tivity to observed suffering of another person (so 
called empathy for pain), people with BD had sub-
tle difficulties in distinguishing such situations 
in which someone’s suffering was a coincidence 
of circumstances, from situations in which pain 
was inflicted intentionally. The authors, based 
on the results of their research, have postulated 
that patients with BD have ability to draw con-
clusions about the intentions of others limited 
to some extent.
No less interesting data is provided by repre-
sentatives of neuropsychology. The key finding 
of neuropsychological studies conducted now-
adays is showing the fact that the deficits asso-
ciated with emotional processing and ToM are 
present even in euthymic patients, suggesting 
that they could be included in the payment of 
BD’s endophenotypes [12]. However, drawing 
conclusions on this topic requires some caution: 
it turns out that the results are largely dependent 
on what aspect of ToM was measured, and what 
tool was selected for this purpose. Many stud-
ies, in which the functioning of ToM in remitted 
subjects was measured using verbal tasks, indi-
cated the moderately or highly severe dysfunc-
tion in the area of reading other people’s mental 
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states. On the other hand, in cases where the in-
vestigators used the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test [22] (which relies on the recognition of emo-
tions presented in photographs depicting human 
eyes), the observed dysfunctions were very small 
- sometimes non-significant. This is due to the 
fact that ToM is not a single construct, but a di-
verse set of processes, each of which can be in 
a different extent affected by the specific nature 
of BD. Therefore, ToM should not be considered 
in terms of the ability that subject has a hun-
dred percent or does not have at all, but rather 
in terms of continuum [12]. The sources of valu-
able data on the impact of BD on ToM, are stud-
ies of neuropsychological abnormalities (consti-
tuting a potential biological substrate of distur-
bances of ToM) in patients’ first-degree relatives. 
The functioning of healthy relatives is not mod-
ified by long-term use of drugs, the incidence 
of acute symptoms of the disease and its chro-
nicity, therefore it can provide a reliable over-
view of the mechanism of BD [12]. An interest-
ing research in this paradigm was conducted 
by a group led by Jane Whitney [13]. Their aim 
was to determine the differences in socio-emo-
tional processing and functioning between very 
young people at high risk of BD (having a di-
agnosed parent and subtle mood disorders, but 
not fully developed BD) and healthy controls, 
without genetic load. It was observed that the 
group of subjects with an increased risk of devel-
oping bipolar disorder is characterized by sig-
nificant abnormalities in social functioning, con-
cerning, among other things: social awareness, 
social cognition and communication skills. There 
were no significant differences in the function-
ing of ToM and recognition of emotional expres-
sions between the two groups.
ThEORy Of MIND IN MOOD DISORDERS  
- MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
In the group of patients with a diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder some deficits in the-
ory of mind have also been observed. There is a 
growing interest in the hypothesis that impaired 
social cognition in depressive patients (which in-
clude, inter alia, ToM) may be a factor contribut-
ing to the difficulties in psychosocial function-
ing frequently occurring among them [23]. Un-
doubtedly, the processing of information about 
the social world can be distorted under the in-
fluence of person’s emotional state: our conclu-
sions about the social world are often consistent 
with our mood [23].
Sample research illustrating deficits in ToM 
associated with depression, was conducted 
by a team of Morten Kaletsch [24]. The study 
was attended by 30 depressed inpatients and 
30 healthy volunteers. The subjects watched 
the movie about social interactions - their task 
was to recognize emotions expressed by the 
actors and to assess their confidence that they 
discerned them correctly. It was observed that 
patients perceive in the presented interactions 
more negative emotions than healthy controls. 
What is more, they evaluated the interactions, in 
which negative emotions were present, as more 
intense, and were then more confident in their 
evaluations. Authors of another interesting re-
search are Wolkenstein and his colleagues [25]. 
In the first part of their study, the participants 
were asked to complete the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test. It turned out that there was no dif-
ference between the group of depression patients 
and a group of healthy subjects in the overall 
accuracy of emotions recognition. Researchers 
demonstrated, however, a relationship between 
the “group” (depressive / healthy) and “stimulus 
valence” (positive emotion / negative emotion 
/ neutral expression): patients identified nega-
tive emotions more accurately than the control 
group. Moreover, people with depressive symp-
toms were characterized by reduced ability of 
rational social information processing (shown in 
the film which was presented in the second part 
of the study) and drawing conclusions about 
the mental states of the involved characters. At-
tempts were also made to look at the relationship 
between the intensity and specificity of depres-
sive symptoms and the ability to decode mental 
states [26]. Regardless of the severity of the dis-
ease (mild or moderate and severe depression), 
all examined patients received a similar aver-
age number of correct answers in the Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test, although the difference 
between the results of people with mild or mod-
erate depression and the control group did not 
reach statistical significance (the first group was 
characterized by a large variety and range of re-
sults). Quite different data was obtained in a 
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study conducted a bit earlier [27], where people 
having some subclinical symptoms of depression 
achieved significantly better results in the Read-
ing the Mind in the Eyes Test than those in the con-
trol group. Similarly, the authors of another re-
search [28] demonstrated that although devel-
oped depressive disorder may adversely affect 
the ability of the individual to draw conclusions 
about the emotional state of another person (af-
fective ToM), the mild symptoms of depression 
or anxiety - not in line with the clinical severity - 
can support this capability. Interestingly, the re-
duced efficiency of ToM is also seen as a risk fac-
tor for recurrence of symptoms of depression in 
euthymic patients. For example, the authors of 
certain study [29] showed that more than half of 
the people, who have obtained results indicating 
the presence of the deficit in ToM, had a recur-
rence within a year of the study.
EMPAThy
Like ToM, empathy consists of two compo-
nents: cognitive and emotional (affective). Cog-
nitive dimension of empathy is understood as 
the ability to imagine or understand the mental 
states of other people (some authors equate this 
dimension of empathy with ToM – [15]), while 
the emotional component - as the ability to re-
spond to the emotional states of others. Emo-
tional response, which may be classified in the 
payment of reaction resulting from affective em-
pathy, is one that is adequate to another person’s 
mental state, which caused this reaction [30]. We 
cannot, for example, consider to be empathet-
ic the reaction of satisfaction in reply to some-
one’s failure or the reaction involving the de-
sire to help motivate only by unpleasant sensa-
tions caused by watching someone else’s suffer-
ing. What distinguishes the response associated 
with our own negative feelings from truly em-
pathic reaction is focus on our own experiences 
rather than on other people [30].
EMPAThy AND AffECTIVE DISORDERS
There are many studies showing that patients 
with bipolar disorder fall worse than the group 
of healthy individuals in tasks measuring such 
elements of empathy as recognition of emotions, 
perspective-taking and emotional reactivity [31]. 
Moreover, people with a diagnosis of BD often 
describe themselves as less empathic, low assess 
their ability to adopt the perspective of others 
and empathic concern [31]. Interesting results 
on this subject were contributed by Eva-Mar-
ia Seidel and her co-workers [32]. The authors 
defined empathy as a complex competence, in-
volving not only understanding of the emotions 
of others, but also understanding and regulat-
ing own emotional experiences. In the study de-
signed to look at both mentioned empathy as-
pects in persons with BD it was demonstrated 
that the ability to take emotional perspective 
does not significantly differ between the group 
of patients in euthymia and a group of healthy 
volunteers, although patients needed more time 
to perform the task testing this skill. It was also 
observed that drawing the conclusions concern-
ing emotions, which are accompanied by social 
context, seems to be easier for patients than rec-
ognizing emotions solely on the basis of facial 
expressions. Importantly, there was a significant 
correlation demontrated between the severity of 
residual symptoms of mania or depression and 
the intensity of the difficulty of perspective-tak-
ing on an emotional level). This suggests that the 
ability of compassion is dependent on the cur-
rent emotional state of the individual and may 
vary with changes in the symptoms. The last of 
the conclusions made by the Eva-Maria Seidel 
and her colleagues [32] says that patients with 
BD have impaired ability to identify and predict 
the emotions that they would experience if they 
were in some situation, described to them by re-
searcher during the test.
Studies conducted with the participation of 
people suffering from major depressive disor-
der showed that they also have some dysfunc-
tions of empathy - at least in the acute phase 
of the disease. For example, in an experiment of 
Fujino et al. [33], patients with depression attrib-
uted less negative value to the stimuli associat-
ed with pain (these were scenes from the mov-
ie of the hand needle puncture) than healthy 
controls. On this basis, the authors suggest that 
depressive patients may have troubles with un-
derstanding the emotions of others. In another 
study [34] there was the additional factor high-
lighted that may modify the functioning of em-
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pathy, which is severity of disease’s symptoms. 
This research was attended by persons in com-
plete remission, persons with subclinical inten-
sity of symptoms, patients with moderate de-
pression and a control group. The authors found 
that depressive patients have more difficulties in 
perspective-taking than healthy subjects and ex-
hibit less empathic concern, which contradicts 
the results of previous studies in which people 
with depression and the control group received 
similar values point in the scale measuring 
the tendency to empathic concern [35]. It there-
fore appears that the level of mentioned empa-
thy index can fluctuate and vary depending on 
the course of the disease [34]. It was also found 
that the burden of depression (for example by 
its multiple recurrences) is negatively correlated 
with the capacity to take someone else’s perspec-
tive, however neither the level of cognitive, nor 
affective empathy was influenced by the sever-
ity of symptoms at the time of the investigation 
[34]. It is worth noting that there are reports in 
which such a relationship has been demonstrat-
ed [36], what points to the fact that this area re-
quires further exploration.
A broad overview of research on the function-
ing of empathy among patients with MDD was 
made by Schreiter and his colleagues [37]. It fol-
lows that: (1) depression is often associated with 
enhanced discomfort that arises in response to 
observed suffering of others (it is so called per-
sonal distress or empathic stress), (2) depressed 
subjects usually do not differ from healthy per-
sons in terms of the manifestation of empath-
ic concern, but (3) they more often have deficits 
of cognitive empathy. In summary, according to 
mentioned meta-analysis, both aspects of empa-
thy - affective and cognitive – may be subjects to 
some changes with the emergence of symptoms 
of depressive disorder.
In the light of the above considerations, the 
question arises: is there a genetic background 
of social behavior’s impairment in MDD? A large 
number of studies that investigate the issue of 
the potential genetic basis of social and moral 
behavior concerning depressed patients is de-
voted to the importance of polymorphism of the 
5-HTTLPR gene [38]. According to Ahmad Har-
iri and his colleagues, this polymorphism seems 
to have a significant impact on the functioning 
of the amygdala (a structure of the limbic sys-
tem), and - as a result - it affects some of the 
basic mechanisms involved in the processing of 
negative emotions. [39]. This finding allows con-
cluding that mentioned differences in the gen-
otype of individuals will manifest itself in a di-
verse emotional reactivity and in differences in 
susceptibility to stress [40]. In the long run, per-
sons with the “worse” combination of alleles 
may have increased risk of developing depres-
sion, by a lower resistance to stressful events. 
What is important, authors of some of the re-
cent research found that polymorphism 5-HT-
TLPR gene not only modulates mood, but it can 
also affect - to some extent - the process of mor-
al decision-making [38, 41 ], therefore it signif-
icantly influences our social functioning. Inter-
estingly, serotonin (neurotransmitter, the oper-
ation of which is encoded by described gene) 
seems to play an important role in the regula-
tion of social behavior of different species, not 
just of people [38]. For example, it was observed 
that the anti-social and aggressive behavior is as-
sociated with low levels of serotonin, while the 
intact (or even increased) activity of the seroton-
ergic system is a prerequisite for pro-social be-
havior [42, 43]. There is evidence that enhancing 
the activity of serotonin system (by administer-
ing SSRI to patients with depression) modulates 
empathic responses to observed harm of another 
person, and that this effect is stronger in people 
who have a high level of empathy as a trait [44]. 
In other words, appropriate level of serotonin is 
necessary to keep the level of empathy and func-
tioning of other moral emotions (described be-
low) untouched.
MORAl EMOTIONS: gUIlT AND ShAME
Moral emotions are those that are induced in 
the context of compliance with accepted rules 
or violation of them. They indicate to us the mo-
ment at which we exceed certain standards and 
help us to inhibit socially unacceptable reac-
tions [45]. The group of most important feelings 
of this type includes, among others, empathy de-
scribed above (although for the purpose of this 
study, a broader definition of this construct has 
been adopted, which contains both affective and 
cognitive aspects of empathy), and next to it - a 
sense of guilt and shame [46, 47]. It is believed 
that guilt usually arises in the context of social 
exchange between the subjects of interaction, 
when one of them feels that they caused harm 
to another [46], while shame is not limited to a 
particular situation, but stems from a sense that 
the whole personality of the individual is moral-
ly wrong [5, 46]. Some researchers point out that 
both of these emotions involve different types 
of behavior: guilt is associated with a tenden-
cy to repair the caused harms, and the feeling of 
shame - with avoidance or aggression [48].
MORAl EMOTIONS IN AffECTIVE DISORDERS
Among the studies of moral emotions in pa-
tients with affective disorders, those that de-
scribe the issues of major depression outweigh. 
Reports on bipolar disorder tend to focus more 
on the behavior associated with crossing of 
standards than on the feelings, although some 
of them also refer to the emotional mechanisms. 
For example, Fletcher and his team [49], in an 
attempt to explore and describe the expression 
of the risky behavior of hypomanic bipolar pa-
tients, asked their subjects whether they had a 
sense of guilt after spending large amount of 
money. The statements of patients confirmed 
that their mood worsened when they realized 
that their behavior was inappropriate. An impor-
tant limitation of the study cited above (which 
is pointed out also by its authors) is the fact that 
at the time of the research, patients underwent 
an episode of depression, which could signifi-
cantly affect their responses. A study directly re-
ferring to guilt and shame in patients with af-
fective disorders (BD and MDD) was conduct-
ed by Highfield et al. [50]. Researchers observed 
that patients with recurrent depression have a 
higher tendency to feel shame than bipolar sub-
jects, and that among all patients with affective 
disorders this tendency is significantly strong-
er than in the control group. A very interesting 
study was conducted by Zahn and his colleagues 
[51]. Researchers noted that increased tendency 
to blame ourselves and reduced - to apportion 
blame to others, may be associated with suscep-
tibility to depression. Similar conclusions were 
drawn by the team of Green [52], postulating 
that not only the dominance of negative emo-
tionality, but a certain imbalance in this area (be-
tween the tendency to blame ourselves and the 
tendency to blame other people) can be a predic-
tor of the development of a depressive episode.
SUMMATION
To summarize the above descriptions of the 
constructs included in the analysis: theory 
of mind, empathy and selected moral emotions, 
it is worth noting that the knowledge of specifics 
of each of them in individuals struggling with 
affective disorders, can help: (1) to understand 
the mechanisms behind their - often disturbed - 
social functioning, and thus - (2) to better under-
stand some of the reactions of patients, and, ac-
cording to some studies [29, 51, 52], (3) to esti-
mate the risk of first appearance or recurrence of 
disease’s symptoms. Hence, conducting research 
moving this subject seems to be significant both 
for the sake of science and clinical practice.
REfERENCES
  1. Barzman, DH, DelBello MP, Fleck DE, Lehmkuhl H., Stra-
kowski SM. Rates, types, and psychosocial correlates of le-
gal charges in adolescents with newly diagnosed bipolar dis-
order. Bipolar Disorders 2007; 9 (4): 339-344.
  2. Soyka M, Zingg Ch. Association for Methodology and Docu-
mentation in Psychiatry Profiles Predict Later Risk for Crim-
inal Behavior and Violent Crimes in Former Inpatients with 
Affective Disorder. J. Forensic Sci. 2010; 55 (3): 655-659.
  3. Fontaine, JRJ, Luyten P, De Boeck P i Corveleyn J. The Test 
of Self-Conscious Affect: Internal structure, differential scales 
and relationships with long-term affects. European Journal of 
Personality 2001; 15: 449-463.
  4. Stuewig J, McCloskey LA. The relation of child maltreatment 
to shame and guilt among adolescents: Psychological routes 
to depression and delinquency. Child Maltreatment, 2005; 10: 
324-336.
  5. Orth U, Berking M, Burkhardt S. Self-Conscious Emotions 
and Depression: Rumination Explains Why Shame But Not 
Guilt is Maladaptive. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin 2006; 32 (12): 1608-1611.
  6. Goodwin FK, Jamison KR. Manic-Depressive Illness: Bipolar 
Disorders and Recurrent Depression. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press; 2007.
  7. Kernberg OF, Yeomans FE. Borderline personality disorder, 
bipolar disorder, depression, attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder, and narcissistic personality disorder: Practical dif-
54 Roksana Epa, Dominika Dudek
Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 2015; 2: 49–56
 Theory of mind, empathy and moral emotions in patients with affective disorders 55
Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 2015; 2: 49–56
ferential diagnosis. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic 2013; 
77 (1): 1-22.
  8. Swann AC, Geller B, Post RM. Practical Clues to Early Rec-
ognition of Bipolar Disorder: A Primary Care Approach. Pri-
mary Care Companion to the Journal of Clinical psychiatry 
2005; 7: 15-21.
  9. Zhao Y, Zhao G. Emotion regulation and depressive symp-
toms: Examining the mediation effects of school connect-
edness in Chinese late adolescents. J. Adolesc. 2015; 40: 
12-23.
10. Elovainio M, Jokela M, Rosenström T, Pilkki-Råbäck L, 
Hakulinen C, Josefsson K, Hinsanen M, Hintsa T, Raitaka-
ri OT, Keltikangas-Järvinen L. Temperament and depressive 
symptoms: What is the direction of the association? J. Affect. 
Disord. 2015; 170: 203-212.
11. Premack D, Woodruff G. Does the chimpanzee have a the-
ory of mind? Behav. Brain Sci. 1978; 4: 515-526.
12. Samamé C. Social cognition throughout the three phases of 
bipolar disorder: A state-of-the-art overview. Psychiatry Res. 
2013; 210: 1275-1268.
13. Whitney J, Howe M, Shoemaker V, Li S, Sanders EM, Dijam-
co C, Acquaye T, Phillips J, Singh M, Chang K. Socio-emo-
tional processing and functioning of youth at high risk for bi-
polar disorder. J. of Affect. Disord. 2013; 148: 112–117.
14. Terrien S, Stefaniak N, Blondel M, Mouras H, Morvan Y, Be-
sche-Richard C. Theory of mind and hypomanic traits in gen-
eral population. Psychiatry Res. 2014; 215: 694–699.
15. Pluta A. Mechanizmy poznawcze teorii umysłu. Roczniki psy-
chologiczne 2012; 15 (1): 7 – 30.
16. Sabbagh MA. Understanding orbitofrontal contributions to 
theory-of-mind reasoning: Implications for autism. Brain 
Cogn. 2004; 55: 209-219.
17. Cusi AM, MacQueen GM, McKinnon MC. Patients with bipo-
lar disorder show impaired performance on complex tests of 
social cognition. Psychiatry Res. 2012; 200: 258–264.
18. Van Rheenen TE, Rossell SL. Picture sequencing task per-
formance indicates theory of mind deficit in bipolar disorder. 
J. Affect. Disord. 2013; 151: 1132–1134.
19. Purcell AL, Phillips M, Gruber J. In your eyes: Does theory 
of mind predict impaired life functioning in bipolar disorder? 
J. Affect. Disord. 2013; 151: 1113–1119.
20. Schenkel LS, Chamberlain TF, Towne TL. Impaired Theory of 
Mind and psychosocial functioning among pediatric patients 
with Type I versus Type II bipolar disorder. Psychiatry Res. 
2014; 215: 740–746.
21. Baez S, Herrera E, Villarin L, Theil D, Gonzalez-Gadea ML, 
Gomez P, Mosquera M, Huepe D, Strejilevich S, Vigliecca 
NS, Mattha¨us F , Decety J, Manes F, Iban˜ ez AM. Contex-
tual Social Cognition Impairments in Schizophrenia and Bi-
polar Disorder. PLoS ONE 2013; 8(3).
22. Baron-Cohen S, Jolliffe T., Mortimore C, Robertson M. An-
other advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very 
high functioning adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome. 
J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 1997; 38: 813-822.
23. Ladegaard N, Lysaker, PH, Larsen ER, Videbech P. A com-
parison of capacities for social cognition and metacognition 
in first episode and prolonged depression. Psychiatry Res. 
2014; 220 (3): 883-889.
24. Kaletsch M, Pilgramm S, Bischoff M , Kindermann S, Sau-
erbier I, Stark R, Lis S, Gallhofer B, Sammer G, Zentgraf K, 
Munzert J, Lorey B. Major depressive disorder alters percep-
tion of emotional body movements. Front. Psychiatry 2014; 
5: 4.
25. Wolkenstein L, Schönenberg M,Schrim E, Hautzinger M. 
I can see what you feel, but I can’t deal with it: Impaired 
theory of mind in depression. J. Affect. Disord. 2011; 132: 
104-111.
26. Lee L, Harkness KL, Sabbagh MA, Jacobson JA. Mental 
state decoding abilities in clinical depression. J. Affect. Dis-
ord. 2005; 86: 247-258.
27. Harkness KL, Sabbagh MA, Jacobson JA, Chowdrey NK, 
Chen T. Enhanced accuracy of mental state decoding in dys-
phoric college students. Cognition and Emotion 2005; 19 (7): 
999-1025.
28. Poletti M, Sonnoli A, Bonuccelli U. Mild Depressive Symp-
toms are Associated With Enhanced Affective Theory of Mind 
in Nonclinical Adult Women. J. Neuropsychiatry Clin Neuros-
ci. 2014, 26 (2): 63-64.
29. Inoue Y, Yamada K, Kanba S. Deficit in theory of mind is a 
risk for relapse of major depression. J. Affect. Disord. 2006; 
95: 125–127.
30. Lawrence EJ, Shaw P, Baker D, Baron-Cohen S i David AS. 
Measuring empathy: reliability and validity of the Empathy 
Quotient. Psychol. Med. 2004; 34: 911-924.
31. Derntl B, Seidel E, Schneider F, Habel U. How specific are 
emotional deficits? A comparison of empathic abilities in 
schizophrenia, bipolar and depressed patients. Schizophr. 
Res. 2012; 142 (1-3): 58-64.
32. Seidel E-M, Habel U, Finkelmeyer A, Hasmann A, Dobmeier 
M, Derntl B. Risk or resilience? Empathic abilities in patients 
with bipolar disorders and their first-degree relatives. J. Psy-
chiatr. R. 2012; 46 (3): 382–388.
33. Fujino J, Yamasaki N, Miyata J, Kawada R, Sasaki H, Mat-
sukawa N, Takemura, A, Ono M, Tei S, Takahashi H, Aso T, 
Fukuyama H, Murari T. Altered brain response to others’ pain 
in major depressive disorder. J. Affect. Disord. 2014; 165: 
170 – 175.
34. Cusi AM, MacQueen GM, Spreng RN, McKinnon MC. Altered 
empathic responding in major depressive disorder: Relation 
to symptom severity, illness burden, and psychosocial out-
come. Psychiatry Res. 2011; 188: 231–236.
35. O’Connor LE, Berry JW, Weiss J, Gilbert P. Guilt, fear, sub-
mission, and empathy in depression. J. Affect. Disord. 2002; 
71: 19–27.
56 Roksana Epa, Dominika Dudek
Archives of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, 2015; 2: 49–56
36. Donges US, Kersting A, DannlowskiU, Lalee-Mentzel J, Arolt 
V, Suslow T. Reduced awareness of others’ emotions in un-
ipolar depressed patients. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 2005; 193: 
331–337.
37. Schreiter S, Pijnenborg GHM, Aan Het Rot M. Empathy in 
adults with clinical or subclinical depressive symptoms. J. Af-
fect. Disord. 2013; 150 (1): 1-16.
38. Siwek M, Jaeschke R, Dudek D, Czyżowska N. Moral Devel-
opment, Normativity, and Mental Disorders. In:Stelmach J, 
Brożek B, Hohol M, editors. The Many Faces of Normativity. 
Kraków: Copernicus Center Press; 2013. p. 309-333.
39. Hariri AR, Mattay VS, Tessitore B, Kolachana B, Fera F, Gold-
man D, Egan MF, Weinberger DR. Serotonin Transporter Ge-
netic Variation and the Response of Human Amygdala. Sci-
ence 2002; 297: 400-403.
40. Caspi K, Sugden TE, Moffitt TE, Taylor A, Craig IW, Har-
rington H, McClay J, Mill J, Martin J, Braithwaite A, Poul-
ton R. Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation 
by a Polymorphism in the 5-HHT Gene. Science 2003; 301: 
386-389.
41. Marsh AA, Crowe SL, Yu HH, Grodetsky EK, Goldman D, 
Blair RJ. Serotonin Transporter Genotype (5-HTTLPR) Pre-
dicts Utilitarian Moral Judgments. PLoS One 2011; 6 (10).
42. Crockett MJ. The Neurochemistry of Fairness: Clarifying the 
Link Between Serotonin and Prosocial Behavior. Ann. New 
York Acad. Sci. 2009; 27: 76 – 86.
43. Milczek KA, de Almeida RM, Kravitz EA, Rissman EF, de 
Boer SF, Raine A. Neurobiology of Escalated Aggression and 
Violence. J. Neurosci 2007; 27: 11803-11806.
44. Crocket MJ, Clark L, Hauser MD, Robbins TW. Serotonin Se-
lectively Influenced Moral Judgment and Behavior Through 
Effect on Harm Aversion. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 2010; 
107: 17433 – 17438.
45. Strus W. Dojrzałość emocjonalna a funkcjonowanie moralne. 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Liberi Libri; 2012.
46. Haidt J. The moral emotions. In: Davidson RJ, Scherer KR, 
Goldsmith HH, editors. Handbook of affective sciences. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press; 2003. p. 852- 870.
47. Stuewig J, McCloskey LA. The relation of child maltreatment 
to shame and guilt among adolescents: Psychological routes 
to depression and delinquency. Child Maltreatment 2005; 10: 
324-336.
48. Tangney JP, Wagner P, Fletcher C, Gramzow R. Shamed 
into anger? The relation of shame and guilt to anger and 
self-reported aggression. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1992; 62: 
669-675.
49. Fletcher K, Parker G, Paterson A, Synnott H. High-risk be-
haviour in hypomanic states. J. Affect. Disord. 2013; 150 
(1): 50-56.
50. Highfield J, Markham D, Skinner M, Neal A. An investigation 
into the experience of self-conscious emotions in individuals 
with bipolar disorder, unipolar depression and non-psychiat-
ric controls. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy 2010; 
17 (5): 395-405.
51. Zahn R, Lythe KE, Gethin JA, Green S, Deakin JFW, Work-
man C, Moll J. Negative emotions towards others are dimin-
ished in remitted major depression. European Psychiatry, in 
press (first published online: 05.03.2015).
52. Green S, Moll J, Deakin JFW, Hulleman J, Zahn R. Prone-
ness to Decreased Negative Emotions in Major Depressive 
Disorder when Blaming Others rather than Oneself. Psycho-
pathology 2013; 46: 34-44.
